Country

Governing Body / Regulation

Executives Covered

Deferral

Vesting

Clawbacks / Holdbacks1

Notes

G-20

Financial Stability Board - Principles

(1) senior executive population and (2) employees whose actions have a material impact on the firm’s risk exposure

40% - 60%, with higher levels for more senior execs

At least 3 years, pro rata

Unvested portion of deferred compensation should be clawed back in the event of negative contribution during vesting term

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Canada

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Following G-20 Principles

France

French Banking Federation

Executives at French and foreign banks whose activities may have a material impact on banks’ risk exposure

At least 50% and at least 60% for highest paid

At least 3 years, pro rata

Actual payment of deferred compensation subject to ongoing results.  May be reduced or not paid at all

These regulations are in addition to the G-20 principles

Ministry of Finance Proposal

50% corporate tax on banks for bonuses paid in 2010 that exceed €27,500

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One-time tax to be presented to Parliament for vote in January

Switzerland

FINMA – Remuneration Circular

(1) senior management; (2) people with relatively high total compensation; and (3) people whose activities have a significant influence on the risk profile of the firm

Significant percentage for at least 3 years

If within 3 years, should vest pro rata, at most

Changes in value of deferred amounts should offer symmetrical upside/downside adjustments for positive/negative future performance

Certification of compliance by 4/30/11

Policies must be applied firm-wide, but specific deferral and vesting is only for the noted employees

Country

Governing Body / Regulation

Executives Covered

Deferral

Vesting

Clawbacks / Holdbacks1

Notes

United Kingdom

Financial Services Authority – Remuneration Policy Statement

Principle 8 (“P8”) employees: (1) Employees who perform a “significant influence function” for a firm or (2)  whose activities have or could have a material impact on a firm’s risk profile (an employee in this category is a P8 employee if the total expected compensation for 2009 is greater than £1 Million

60%, if over £500K, 40% minimum for others

At least 3 years, pro rata at most not beginning before 12 months

Performance adjustments should apply to a minimum of 75% of the deferred bonus

Non-P8 employees with total comp greater than £500k and who have a bonus to salary ratio of 2:1 or greater should have a minimum level of deferment of 40%

Walker Review

‘High end’ earners, defined as anyone within Banks and other Financial Institutions who perform a ‘significant influence function’ for the entity or whose activities have / could have ‘a material impact on the risk profile of the entity’

83%

50% of bonus being short term, paid out at 17% per year. 50% long term, paid out equally after 3 and 5 years

All deferred awards should be subject to clawback where appropriate

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HM Treasury – Pre-Budget Report

UK resident banks or foreign banks conducting trade in the UK through a permanent establishment

‘Bank’ is defined as a company engaging in certain “Relevant Regulated Activities”

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50% payroll tax on discretionary incentives paid between 9 December 2009 and 5 April 2010 that exceed £25,000

One-time tax charge on the employing organization not individual employees

United States

Federal Reserve - Proposed Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Principles

(1) Senior executives and others responsible for the oversight of the firm or material business lines; (2) Individual employees whose activities may expose the firm to material amounts of risk; and  (3) Groups of employees who, in aggregate, may expose the firm to material amounts of risk

Substantial portion

Multi-year period

Performance-based adjustments of deferred amounts are one way to make pay more sensitive to risk

Final Guidance not yet published